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The method of reflective equilibrium (RE) – and, subsequently, the method of wide reflective 
equilibrium (WRE) – has been advocated as a device for theory acceptance in ethics, the 
justification of moral beliefs and testing the adequacy of conceptions of morality and of  moral 
conceptions, respectively.1 In this article, I shall primarily address the application of (W)RE to 
the question of the adequacy of moral conceptions. Nevertheless, the views which I shall put 
forward also have important consequences for the application of (W)RE to matters of moral 
justification and the testing of moral theories and conceptions of morality. My main interest in 
all this will be with the role played by considered judgements or intuitions, as some authors 
prefer to call them, in (W)RE when applied to questions of conceptualisation.  
John Rawls (1971, 47-48) takes considered judgements to be judgements ‘rendered under 
conditions favorable to the exercise of the sense of justice, and therefore in circumstances 
where the more common excuses and explanations for making a mistake do not obtain [...]’, 
while the person making the judgement is presumed ‘to have the ability, the opportunity, and 
the desire to reach a correct decision [...]’. These are often quoted – and criticised – 
requirements. The controversy mainly relates to the vagueness of these requirements. Rawls 
nowhere explains what circumstances exactly give rise to excuses and explanations for 
mistakes, nor does he state what it is to have a desire to reach a correct decision. However, the 
formulas, because of their moralistic ring, are highly suggestive. According to the requirement 
to exclude situations in which excuses and explanations for mistakes obtain,  the person must 
probably be unaffected by hallucinations, sub- and superliminal manipulation, severe suffering, 
time limitations, sensory handicaps, mental illness, distracting disturbances and stupidity in 
general. According to the requirement of the pursuit of a correct decision, the person must also 
have the will or the intention to become or remain unaffected by such misfortunes. With 
respect to the latter condition, it is difficult to understand what else Rawls may have meant by 
desiring to reach the correct decision, where the content of the correct decision cannot already 
be known to the person desiring to reach it.  Apparently, the simple absence of the distortive 
conditions is not enough. In a rather Kantian vein, Rawls wants us to believe that persons 
should want them to be absent, as well: they should long for truth. 
However this may be, let us, as so many do, assume that according to these requirements 
considered judgements are not arbitrary, ill-considered or made under any kind of duress.2 And 
let us, with others such as Aronovitch (1996), assume that these judgements are a kind of pre-
theoretical intuitions which may be about particular cases or more general ideas. Then, a 
question comes to mind which has received far less attention, i.e., whose considered judgement 
are we talking about? 
                                                             
1 See, for instance, respectively: Daniels (1979),  Heeger (1992b),  Nielsen (1982a) and Swanton (1991). 
2 The formulation is Nielsen’s (1982a). 
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This question, of course, should be placed in the broader context of the question of which 
arrangement of principles, background theories and considered judgements exactly is being 
described when we say that a reflective equilibrium is reached. Are we primarily talking of 
(W)RE as a psychological category, i.e., as something which can exist in one specific person’s 
mind or in the minds of a group of specific persons? Or are we talking predominantly of 
(W)RE as an epistemological category, i.e., as something which is rather an ideal dimension of 
an arrangement of propositions? Although, to my mind, no one has ever clearly and explicitly 
defended the psychological perspective, there is nevertheless a certain tendency among 
important proponents of (W)RE to think of them as psychological categories. It is astonishing 
to find how little effort has been made even by Rawls and Daniels to avoid an empirically or  
factually fashioned way of describing (W)RE. They present to us persons who reason under 
favourable circumstances, who have an urge for correctness and who ‘go back and forth, 
pruning and adjusting’ principles, reasons, conceptions, intuitions and theories. Nowhere are 
we admonished to think of them and their activities as just hypothetical arrangements or, 
rather, as normative proposals. It should come as no surprise, then, that, for instance, Kai 
Nielsen and others have advocated (W)RE as a method of reaching consensus, which is a 
matter of factual psychological convergence rather than a matter of justification or even truth.3  
The problem with this matter-of-fact way of talking about (W)RE is that it endorses well-
known criticisms of (W)RE holding that these methods are not much more than ways of 
bringing the elements of an individual’s or a group of individuals’ moral thought into (a kind 
of) coherence, scarcely excluding or adjusting extremely subjective views or prejudice. The 
latter are not avoided by the requirements vis-à-vis considered judgements stated earlier on. A 
judgement may be completely subjective and even turn out to be a prejudice by some criteria, 
but need not at the same time be ill-considered or arbitrary. If, as the factual way of talking 
about (W)RE suggests, the input qua considered judgements in a piece of (W)RE reasoning 
comes mainly from a specific individual or a specific group of individuals here and now, then 
the critical force against subjectivism and prejudice must come from the elements which may 
be expected to be less affected by strictly personal preferences, e.g. principles and background 
theories. But, then again: what exactly permits us to cherish the hope that an individual’s or a 
group’s principles and theories are unaffected, and, in the famous process of adjusting and 
pruning required by the methods of (W)RE, will remain unaffected by subjectivism and moral 
bigotry? For, as is so often stressed by proponents of (W)RE, the emendation process of 
(W)RE works back and forth, not necessarily only changing and adapting the considered 
judgements. Emphasising the hic et nunc character of (W)RE certainly will not do to enhance 
confidence in this respect. 
                                                             
3 Note that Nielsen (1982a) talks of consensus as a result of applying the method of WRE, whereas Rawls 
(1971, 580-581) had already pointed to some common starting points as a necessary preliminary  for 
making the application of RE work. 
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In an attempt to amend the inherent liability to subjectivism, Nielsen (1982b) suggested to 
let judgements actually agreed upon within a community take the place of considered 
judgements. However, Christine Swanton pointed out that regarding questions of 
conceptualisation, where so-called contested concepts of morality are concerned, not much 
help is to be expected from judgements on which individuals explicitly agree: controversy 
abides even over paradigm cases. Instead, Swanton (1991) suggested to use, what Aristotle 
called ‘endoxa’.4 Endoxa can be characterised as the judgements and conceptions of the many 
and the wise, expressed in pieces of common knowledge and statements by writers, scientists, 
theorists, etc., not necessarily only contemporary but historical as well. These are - I think -  
about the same pieces of common knowledge and statements which Nielsen (19***, 317) 
called ‘considered judgements given in the traditions which are part of our culture’.  
Neither of the authors seems to think that these judgements introduce a kind of objective 
normative basis to (W)RE that would run counter to the alleged anti-foundationalist character 
of the method. This contention is true when the idea of an objective normative basis is 
interpreted very narrowly. Including endoxa or the conceptions and statements from a tradition 
as considered judgements in (W)RE will only be likely to reduce the possibilities of 
subjectivism, because some contingent limitations of actual individuals or groups of individuals 
are transcended. However, if (W)RE were related to a view or theory of moral language and 
morality, which I shall provisionally call a functional-contextual approach, then (W)RE would 
be vested with an additional justificatory force. This would enhance its possibilities to be 
defended against allegations concerning its subjectivist taint. Let me elaborate this point in the 
next sections. 
 
2. The meaning of complex notions 
 
There is a way of looking at morality and language which suggests that we should assign a 
certain authority to shared experience and knowledge in communities and traditions. It is a 
view in which the rigid distinction between the moral and the non-moral, which is so typical of 
modern philosophy, is approached with scepticism, and in which moral and linguistic intuitions 
seem to coincide or, at least, to intertwine. In order to explain this, I have to elaborate at some 
length on the meaning of complex notions and some claims of the later Wittgenstein and Julius 
Kovesi. 
How are we able to understand complex notions like ‘individual freedom’? Notions like this 
are concepts which have both a normative and a descriptive meaning. Mostly in combinations 
with expressions like ‘respect for’, ‘restrictions on’, etc., they are first of all used in a 
normative way.  Thus, they can be used to advocate or recommend a conceivable state of 
affairs as well as to make clear that an actual or conceivable state of affairs does or does not 
conform to this recommended conceivable state of affairs. In both ways the notion also has a 
descriptive meaning in that it is used to describe an actual state of affairs or a conceivable state 
of affairs. 
Now, how are we able to understand words like this? How can we know their specific 
content? More specifically: what exactly is needed to  know how a notion like this can be 
applied correctly to particular states of affairs and not to others? 
                                                             
4 See also: Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics VII, 1, 5, 1145b1 ff., Nussbaum (1986, 240-263). 
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In replying to this question, one may feel tempted to define the meaning of a word on the 
basis of its descriptive meaning in terms of the resemblances or similarities of the phenomena 
to which the notion may be applied. However, in the case of a complex notion like freedom – 
but the same holds true for more down-to-earth notions like ‘table’, etc. – the relevant 
resemblances and similarities are not easily found, nor are they easily stated. This is so because 
these notions refer to supervenient properties, properties which for their occurrence in actual 
situations ultimately depend on the occurrence of different phenomena in compositions or 
compounds which can vary from situation to situation and from context to context. Because of 
this, definitions of such notions in terms of similarities tend to be too general. A striking 
example of this deficiency is the definition of individual freedom, proposed by MacCallum 
(1967), as a relationship between three elements, viz., (a) a person (b) the absence of 
restrictive conditions and (c) actions, conditions of character or states of affairs.  The problem 
of this definition is that it does not specify the kind or kinds of relationship which should be 
present for freedom to occur, where this is exactly what we want to know. In this respect the 
definition is too general. Nevertheless, even this definition is, at the same time, still too 
specific. It overlooks the possibility, pointed out by Isaiah Berlin, of freedom occurring in the 
binary relationship of a person and the absence of restrictive conditions, without it being the 
case that this person has the intention of performing any action or bringing about a condition of 
character or state of affairs.5 
One can adjust the deficiencies of definitions like these in part by invoking Wittgenstein’s 
idea of ‘Familienähnlichkeiten’ or ‘family resemblances’. According to Wittgenstein (1967, 32, 
remarks 66-67), when we look for the unifying element of the phenomena to which a notion 
can be applied correctly, we often will not find one particular similarity or one specified group 
of similarities. Instead, we will find an unspecified group of resembling characteristics and 
relationships. Wittgenstein compares this kind of similarities and typically intransitive 
relationships with the kind of resemblances in appearance and character existing between the 
members of a family. 
Wittgenstein’s approach clarifies our understanding of the ways in which we use our 
notions by no longer explaining conceptual unity on the basis of one unique characteristic or 
well-defined group of characteristics shared by different phenomena, but on the basis of a set 
of resemblances and relationships not necessarily shared by all phenomena. In this way, he 
extends the possibilities of correctly applying the notions and shows the enormous complexity 
of the ways in which completely different and, at first sight, even opposing phenomena may be 
brought together under one term without rendering it ambiguous. Nevertheless, Wittgenstein 
(1967, 34-36, remarks 71, 77) seems to have taken a pessimistic attitude toward the 
possibilities of expliciting the conceptual unity of complex notions in such a way that it would 
become a little clearer which resemblances and relationships would allow us to correctly apply 
a notion to a phenomenon. For him, the notions remain concepts with blurred edges. And only 
                                                             
5 Berlin’s critique, cited in Swanton (1992, viii-ix). For a thorough critical, though constructive, review of 
philosophical contributions on the subject of freedom during the last decades, see Swanton (1992). 
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by giving illustrative examples of the ways in which we may apply them can we hope to clarify 
the rules for their correct application.6 
                                                             
6 Wittgenstein’s pessimism in a sense is shared by Austin (1979, 180) in his views on so-called 
‘defeasibility notions’: complex notions, the meaning of which can only be found by investigating 
occasions and situations in which we think that the notion certainly cannot be applied. 
Perhaps Wittgenstein’s pessimism can be partially explained by a latent tendency to think of 
family resemblances as the constituents of the unity of the various applications of a notion. The 
possibility that things are in fact the other way around – family resemblances themselves being 
a result of this unity – seems to have escaped his attention. However, when we seriously ask 
why the occurrence of certain phenomena, and not others, in certain arrangements, and not in 
others, in certain contexts, and not in others, must be present in order to apply a term 
correctly, then this question can be answered more satisfactorily than by giving examples of the 
ways in which the notion is applied and by pointing to certain similarities and relationships 
between the phenomena to which it is applied. For, although giving such examples may give 
some vague idea of the general rules for correct application, we will still remain in doubt as to 
whether the resemblances and relationships hinted at are essential or typical for this notion, or 
not. The similarities or relationships may be coincident, having little to do with conditions 
allowing us to use the notion.  
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Evidently, then, there is something else which predominantly determines the conceptual 
unity of notions and restricts the kinds of resemblances and relationships allowing us to gather 
different phenomena under one notion. Wittgenstein (1967, 10, 20, remarks 20, 43) hints at 
this unifying factor by identifying the meaning of words with the ways in which they are used in 
language. Now, identifying the meaning of words with their use seems not much of a help for 
illuminating the rules for the application of notions. What we seek to find are directives for the 
correct use of words. For Wittgenstein (1967, 8, 11, remarks 19, 23; 88 remark  241), 
however, language is not an amalgam of personal and arbitrary instruments for communication. 
He characterises language as a form of life. The meanings of words are not based on personal 
convictions and choices, nor are they the result of agreements between persons or groups. 
Wittgenstein implicitly suggests that language, including the meaning and use of words, is 
based on conventions. This suggestion should not be taken as necessarily implying 
conservatism. Wittgenstein nowhere gives the impression of considering language as a 
congealed, solid set of words and meanings in which the rules for the correct use of notions lay 
statically as sediments of the times before ours, nor does his suggestion necessarily imply that 
language and meaning are the results of an arbitrary historical process. Rather, he seems to 
maintain a certain aloofness to questions concerning the reasons for our linguistic conventions’ 
being as they are, because their sense or nonsense must in turn be judged and formulated 
within that same language, which is our form of life.7  
                                                             
7 Although Wittgenstein (1967, 174) thinks that certain phenomena, such as hoping and promising, are 
only possible through language, he nevertheless supposes that there is a reality outside language (1967, 
230) and that non-linguistic, or rather pre-linguistic,  thinking is possible (1967, 106-110, remarks 327-
340); talking about the latter, however, would make very little sense, according to him. 
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Wittgenstein, because of his self-imposed reserve, did not, at least not explicitly, go much 
further in clarifying meaning in terms of use. I think that this, however, is exactly the point 
where Kovesi’s theory of meaning should be invoked as an implementation. Kovesi (1967) is 
of the opinion that the meaning or use of notions (or, for that matter, the conventions related 
to this use) in turn depends on the functionality of the phenomena, or constellations of 
phenomena, to which these notions refer.8 Using the classical Aristotelic terminology, Kovesi 
(1967, 3, 15, 61-62) claims that with respect to the meaning of complex notions, a distinction 
should be made between a material and a formal element.  The material element is the whole 
range of the particular identifiable properties, respects and contexts of the phenomena to which 
the notion may point. The formal element is that which determines which properties (in which 
respects, in which contexts) may belong to the material element of the notion. The formal 
element in fact reflects the point of the notion. It states the reason why we can apply the notion 
correctly to phenomena, exhibiting certain properties, in certain contexts, in certain respects. 
This reason lies in the function of the phenomena to which the notion can be appplied. We can 
find it by meticulously uncovering the purposes for which we need, are interested in or value 
those phenomena.9 
When proposing his distinction between the formal and the material element of the meaning 
of a notion, Kovesi was mainly interested in bringing about an adjustment in the discussion 
among philosophers about the difference between moral and non-moral notions. This 
difference, according to him, is often confused with the difference between descriptive and 
evaluative terms. In Kovesi’s view descriptive terms are as evaluative as moral ones are, and, 
conversely, moral notions are as descriptive as others are. The difference between moral and 
non-moral notions, however, lies in the different kinds of functions which make up the formal 
element of these different kinds of notions. According to Kovesi (1967, 12-13, 63), the 
different kinds of functions are symptomatic of a different point of view. To this claim, I will 
return. 
 
3. Adjusting and refining the Kovesian view 
 
Although Kovesi’s explanation for the conceptual unity of complex notions is more plausible 
than explanations in terms of similarities or family resemblances taken on their own, his views 
should be adjusted and refined in some important respects. First of all, it should be noted that, 
of course, resemblances and family resemblances as such do play a role in the development of 
our knowledge of the meaning of words. Doubtlessly, in practice, when we have to explain 
notions or when we have to find out whether a notion can be applied, we will look for 
resemblances and relationships without much further ado. These resemblances and 
relationships, however, can also account for many errors. And it is exactly when the need for 
correction is felt or when we are confronted with hitherto unknown situations that we must 
invoke reflection on the formal element or point of the notion.  
Again, this process of discovery of the point of a notion in the purpose of the phenomena to 
                                                             
8 For a critical discussion of Kovesi’s main ideas as well as a reply to these criticisms, see Graham (1975) 
and Shiner and Bickenbach (1976). 
9 The pair of  material element and formal element should not simply  be equated with the pair of extension 
and intension of a notion,  because the formal element always includes a description of the functionality of 
the phenomena to which the notion refers, whereas the intension of a term does not necessarily do so. 
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which the notion refers, does not start from scratch. When Kovesi proposes that, in order to 
find the point of a notion, we look for the purpose of the phenomena, he seems to contradict 
himself. One might reasonably ask: what kind of phenomena should we be looking for? Is not 
that exactly one of the questions we would like to have answered when looking for the point of 
the notion? In other words, it seems as though the Kovesian explanation begs the question. In 
order to know what the notion means we should know what it means. 
I do not at all think that the Kovesian explanation in the end is self-defeating. In a way, yes, 
in order to know what a certain notion means, we already need to have at least some idea of it. 
In looking for meaning, we do not come empty-handed like complete strangers speaking an 
entirely different language. When we look for the point of a notion, we, as it were, plunge into 
the midst of things, on the basis of some part of meaning of the term, which we already know. 
From here we go on, on the basis of some resemblances, relationships and partially uncovered 
functionalities, until we have adjusted and improved, for the time being satisfactorily, our 
knowledge. 
This brings me to a further respect in which the Kovesian explanation could be refined.  
Because of the distinction between the function of words and the function of phenomena to 
which these words point, the explanation – as well as the ways in which Kovesi himself applies 
it to particular notions –  not only suggests that there is a gap between language and reality, 
but also that there is somehow an easy way of bridging this gap. In this, he seems to be 
unconscious of the fact that this assignment of functions to phenomena again is something of 
language or, for that matter, of the knowledge and beliefs that are possible through language. 
The formal element of a meaning must not only be stated in language or its notions, but also be 
understood as part of a larger network of such notions. The question whether it is this net or 
framework of knowledge and beliefs or rather something that transcends it, which ultimately 
constitutes the function of notions, should only be answered with great reserve within that 
language. Here, I will follow Wittgenstein’s example and not try to answer it. 
A third way in which the Kovesian model might be improved is to allow notions to have 
more than one point. With this I do not only suggest a way of explaining equivocality or 
ambiguity of notions. What I have in mind, specifically, is something which can be explained 
best by the example of the notion of individual freedom. 
 
4. Freedom, for example 
 
Christine Swanton (1992) – to my mind in part correctly – stipulates the formal element 
of individual freedom as the optimal functioning of the human individual’s potential in 
practical activity, that is to say: the forming of desires and wants, deliberation, the 
formation of practical judgement and intentions, and the execution of intentions 
through actions. Swanton further adds in a Kovesian vein – and to my mind again 
correctly – that this good functioning should be thought of as a multidimensional, formal 
property, the material conditions of which can vary from context to context. She 
suggests, heavily leaning on Austin’s concept of defeasibility notions, that the idea of the 
optimal functioning of this individual practical potential somehow has evolved from 
experiencing all kinds of flaws and limitations, both from within and from without, 
relating to (parts of) the process of agency, as well as to the (availability, eligibility and 
significance of the) varying objects of (parts of) that process. Now, I think that all this 
may perfectly well be the case. Nevertheless, some features of the notion of freedom can 
be better explained if we allow there to be at least two other points in the formal element 
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of the notion of individual freedom, namely: the purposes of establishing authenticity of 
preferences and moral responsibility. The features of the notion of freedom, which they 
explain best, are concerned with the significance that must be assigned to specific 
restrictions on freedom.  
Swanton somehow seems to confuse the significance of restrictions on freedom with 
the relevance of the significance of options to freedom as such. In Swanton’s view, the 
significance of restrictions on freedom is ultimately a completely subjective matter, 
depending on the affected individual’s preferences and attitudes concerning his own 
freedom.10 This need not be true, even if the optimal functioning of the individual’s 
practical potential were the whole story of the point of freedom. For even then we might 
say that the affected individual’s preferences and attitudes are not the only or necessary 
measure for the significance of restrictions. One might, for instance, also try to use the 
idea of optimal functioning of an individual’s practical potential as such as a measure, 
and for instance state the significance of restrictions in terms of the consequences they 
have for this optimal functioning as a whole. However that may be, we mostly do not 
assess the significance of restrictions on freedom in terms of the involved individuals’ 
subjective preferences concerning their freedom, nor do we invoke straightaway the 
construction of optimal functioning of the individual’s practical potential. What we do 
most often, when we say something concerning the significance of restrictions, is in fact 
even more complicated.  
Let me explain this by first saying something about the situations or contexts in which 
we are mostly or typically interested in the significance of restrictions on freedom. These 
are mainly situations of two types. The first is the kind of situation in which we want to 
know whether an individual’s preferences and desires are truly his. We are concerned 
about the authenticity of his preferences and attitudes because we are afraid that this 
individual by expressing his preferences or by acting upon them might harm himself, or 
bring about something which in some respect is suboptimal for himself in comparison 
with what he might bring about if he were to do nothing or something else. The second 
type is one in which we want to know whether we can hold an individual responsible for 
what he has done. We want to know whether we can hold him responsible because we 
want to be just and fair in our distribution of reward and punishment. In both types of 
situations we will ask whether the individuals in question were sufficiently free as to 
their preferences, attitudes and actions. Or, to put it differently, we want to know 
whether the restrictions on freedom possibly present were so significant that they allow 
us to think of an individual’s preferences as not truly his, or to think of an individual as 
not actually responsible for what he did.  
The significance of restrictions, which is the object of our interest then, is a 
significance measured against a background of conditions of normality, expectancy and 
propriety.11 We apply such standards of normality specifically to situations in which we 
suspect there to be restrictions on the range of available options, on the eligibility of 
those available options and on the individual’s perception of the significance of those 
options. (And here once again, I must warn that significance of options is not the same 
                                                             
10 This is a simplification of her view. From the complicated ways in which she expresses herself, it is clear 
that Swanton (1992, 162-190) is wrestling with the problem, and allows of other solutions. 
11 Cf. Vedder (1995, 57, 63, 67-69, 81), Feinberg (1986, 115, 118-122) and Benn, (1988, 132, 136). 
 
 10 
as significance of restrictions on freedom.) What we try to establish is not whether there 
were any restrictions as to these aspects or dimensions of the freedom of the individual 
involved tout court. We try to assess whether there were restrictions surpassing the 
restrictions that we would normally expect there to be in the total setting of the situation 
and in the individual involved. It is difficult to state the details of these standards, but if 
they were to be spelled out, they would certainly include norms concerning normal 
physical, biological and meteorological circumstances, as well as normal psychological 
and social behaviour of persons involved (including the agent’s own) and even the 
normal functioning of social institutions.  On the basis of these we decide whether 
restrictions are relevant and significant enough, in order to think of a person’s 
preferences as genuinely his own, or to hold him responsible or not responsible. And, 
even more interestingly, as long as the restrictions present do not in fact deviate from 
standards of normality, we have a tendency not to think or talk of them in terms of 
restrictions on freedom at all, notwithstanding the possibly imperfect functioning of the 
individual’s practical potential or the individual’s attitudes towards his limitations. 
Mostly, therefore, we evaluate and describe situations in terms of freedom when we are 
motivated by the purposes of establishing authenticity and responsibility. Only 
occasionally, and perhaps most of all in the context of philosophical exercises, are we 




5. A functional-contextual approach 
 
I have shown how, in the case of a notion such as individual freedom, it may be 
enlightening to accept the possibility of having more than one point to a notion. This 
feature of having more than one point does not render the notion ambiguous. It only 
explains how the notion can be used in ways which do not exclude each other but largely 
overlap. This overlap may, in its turn, be explained by connections between the points in 
question, such as good functioning of the individual’s practical potential, authenticity of 
preferences and attitudes and moral responsibility, in the case of individual freedom. To 
this phenomenon, however, I will return later on. 
To take up the thread of adjusting the Kovesian model of explanation again: I think that 
investigating the linguistic descriptions of the formal elements of complex notions in general 
can endorse the plausibility of the Kovesian model. Particularly, investigating the ways in 
which one may try to complete these descriptions contributes to our understanding of the 
organisation of knowledge, and moral knowledge in particular. 
As Kovesi himself already suggests implicitly, descriptions of the formal element will always 
be only partial descriptions.12 Nevertheless, they can be complemented - be it not perfectly 
completed.  The ways in which this completion will proceed reveals some remarkable features 
of complex notions. For the sake of convenience, I will focus again on notions commonly used 
in the field of morality. 
In describing the formal element of a complex notion, one has to use complex notions again 
which, in turn,  for the sake of completion stand in need of clarification of their formal element, 
for which one must again use complex notions, etc., etc.  One may call these different stages at 
which further formal elements must be explained in order to explain the formal element of the 
notion with which one began, the different levels of description. Perusing all conceivable levels 
of description of a formal element of a notion would be practically impossible for a human 
being.  Nevertheless, one can go on for quite a number of levels. 
                                                             
12 Kovesi (1967, 14-15, 17. 
Even in an incomplete description, at some level it will be necessary to invoke notions 
which do not, or at least not clearly, belong to the same category as the notion with which one 
started. When, for instance, we try to complete the description of the formal element of the 
notion of individual freedom (a value word, that is) by invoking the notions of ‘authenticity of 
preferences’, ‘moral responsibility’, ‘good functioning of the individual’s practical potential’, 
etc. (Vedder 1995, 70-103) and, at some other level, notions like action, will, person, 
individuality, etc., then we go in fact beyond the range of value words. Notions like moral 
responsibility, action, will, person, etc. cannot be considered to be values, at least not or not 
exclusively in the same way as we might consider freedom to be a value. These are words 
which refer to the framework of preconditions for morality as a whole, and in that sense belong 
to the constituents of morality as such. Furthermore, most of them as to their usage are not 
exclusively bound to the domain of the moral as it is traditionally conceived of. Conversely, it 
may very well be the case that in explaining notions which are not considered to be strictly 
moral notions, sooner or later one will have to seek recourse with what traditionally are called 
strictly moral notions or value notions. The fact that moral and non-moral notions play a part 
in each other’s formal element suggests that the distinction between these categories is only a 
superficial one. If one descends to deeper levels of description of the formal element of these 
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notions, the difference evaporates. This phenomenon, to my mind, weakens Kovesi’s claim that 
moral notions and others differ qua point of view. At least things seem to be more complicated 
than Kovesi suggests. 
A second remarkable feature is the phenomenon of apparent self-referral. Again already in 
descriptions with a limited number of levels it will soon become evident that a description of 
the formal element of a notion in a way presupposes itself. This dependency of the meaning of 
a notion on other notions and itself can be compared to the position of a thread in a spider’s 
web. The thread can only stay in its position through its connection with other threads, which 
in turn can only stay in their position and hold the first thread in its position through their 
connection with other threads, among which, of course, is the first thread. In this way, the 
thread depends upon others as well as itself in order to hold its position. 
When we, for instance, describe the formal element of the notion of individual freedom in 
terms of ‘authenticity of preferences’, ‘moral responsibility’ and ‘flourishing of the individual’s 
practical potential’, ‘person’, ‘individuality’ and ‘action’, then the description of the formal 
element of these notions at some stage of the description, and perhaps even more often and at 
different levels, requires the description of the formal element of individual freedom. Put 
differently and by way of example: in order to know what freedom really is, one must, inter 
alia, know what moral responsibility is; in order to know what moral responsibility really is, 
however, one must in a sense know what freedom is.  
This does not mean that the description of the formal element necessarily ends up in a 
vicious circle.13 In a set of levels of description needed for clarification of the point of one 
notion, a description of the formal element of a first notion enters at another, different level of 
the description of the formal element of a second term than the level at which the description 
of the formal element of that second term enters into the description of the formal element of 
the first. These differences qua level of description of the formal element slightly modify the 
perceived meaning of the notions. In this way, each level of description reveals only a certain 
part of the formal element of the notion. Apparently, the different notions used at one level of 
description by their combination nuance the perspective from which the point of the term is 
presented. This implies that in the whole process of the description of the point of a term on 
different levels there are, in a way, slight shifts in the meaning of the notion. We can, for 
instance, sensibly describe the formal element of individual freedom partially in terms of 
responsibility, and responsibility, in turn, partially in terms of freedom, because within the 
process of description, at different levels of description, the meaning of the notion is perceived 
slightly differently. However, understanding the complete meaning of the notion, i.e., the 
complete description of the formal element thereof, would include simultaneous perception of 
all conceivable levels. 
                                                             
13 One may think that we are able to avoid circularity by maintaining that the apparent self-referral is in fact 
only referral to (part of) the material element of the notions. This, to my mind, is not true because for us, 
in order to understand the material element, we need a formal element which organises the material 
element of the notion. This condition also applies during the process of description of the formal element. 
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6. Coherence in a web of meaning 
 
To sum up, the meaning of a moral notion can only be understood by grasping its point or 
points. The point of the notion in turn can only be understood through its connections with 
other notions, both what we traditionally might call moral notions and non-moral notions. For 
the reasons stated earlier on, one cannot conclude from this that it is exactly and exclusively 
this nestling in a whole web of notions, knowledge, beliefs and motivations that gives the 
notion its point and sense. What one may conclude is that the whole web of notions and 
knowledge, beliefs and motivations behind them constitutes a coherent system with that notion. 
Viewed this way, a particular notion may be considered to be one of many focal points of one 
larger framework comparable to a worldview. The coherence and specific connections within 
this framework limit the possible applications of the notion. At the same time, the framework 
seems to hide an unexpected reservoir of possibilities to extend the actual knowledge of 
meanings of terms with maintenance of coherence. 
I will illustrate all this once again with the notion of individual freedom. In doing so, I will 
first take up again the question of plurality of points and ambiguity which I left unanswered 
when talking about the three points of freedom earlier on. Next I will say something about the 
ways in which these points are nestled into something that resembles a worldview.  
As I suggested earlier on, I think that the meaning of individual freedom is best explained by 
reference to three points, which together make up at least a partial description of the formal 
element of the notion, namely: good or optimal functioning of the individual’s practical 
potential, authenticity of preferences and moral responsibility. Envisaging these ‘points’ 
explains how and why we apply the notion of freedom. Now, I think that the good functioning 
of the individual’s freedom is at stake in every situation in which we may apply the notion. But 
often it is at stake in a somewhat meagre or thin sense. What I mean is that we need this point 
to describe and evaluate situations in a rather uninteresting way in terms of freedom. In order 
to make more sense of the notion, literally, as to its more significant usages, one or both of the 
others must come to the fore. The latter two do not come into play necessarily or 
simultaneously. Whether they do, depends on whether the perceived circumstances occasion 
the need to establish authenticity of preferences or moral responsibility.  
When there is more than one point to the application of the notion to a situation, then these 
points do not, to my mind, constitute entirely different meanings of freedom. In cases where 
they underlie the application of the notion on one and the same occasion, they seem to show us 
the same phenomena from only slightly different angles. The ways in which they are connected 
to each other, to my mind, prevents them from constituting entirely different meanings. In the 
case of the formal element of freedom, ambiguity is avoided because good functioning itself is 
part of the description of the formal elements of moral responsibility and authenticity of 
preferences. The remaining slightly different angles from which we view the same phenomena 
under the one heading of freedom in such cases can be explained by the different other 
connections that the three points, when taken separately, have to other notions. With 
authenticity and responsibility, as I have shown, there is another way of interpreting the 
significance of restrictions on freedom than with the good functioning of practical potential. 
This difference, however, can in the end be explained by the connection which the former have 
to other notions such as respect for an individual’s conception of the good and fair distribution 
of appraisal and blame, respectively. 
Although these different connections account for the different ways in which we may use 
the notion of freedom, these differences as such must not be overemphasised. There is unity in 
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the different uses of freedom, thanks to the fact that the three points of the notion are 
interconnected through one of them. But there are more and less oblique ways in which these 
points are interconnected, directly or indirectly through mutual relationships with other 
notions. For instance, I think that we may safely say that all three of them again are tangled up 
with a certain conception of the human individual and individuality. This conception of the 
individual and individuality, in turn, has further connections to, or to put it more accurately: 
has connections within, a larger outlook. In this outlook, the concern for the individual through 
appreciation of the individual’s interpretation of the good and through fair judgement on 
individual merits and demerits is predominant. It receives expression in many diverging ways 
ranging from subjectivist views of values to certain principles of privacy, honesty and justice. 
But the concern for the individual and individuality is not limited to such traditionally moral 
items. It even pervades the ways in which we preferably explain and describe the phenomena of 
the world by making us cling to methodic individualism, and causing unease at the thought of 
attributing causal or even moral responsibilities to collectivities. 
I think that, in general, investigating and making explicit the direct and indirect connections 
between our notions such as those at which I have just hinted can contribute to our 
understanding of the limits of our outlook (and especially our moral outlook). It may, 
however, also help us in refining that outlook by producing possibilities of articulating views 
and claims that are only latently present in that outlook and can only be found by meticulously 
analysing the internal connections of the notions and the knowledge, beliefs and motivations 
that go with them. Such an undertaking, however, is not an easy one. Apart from the natural 
limitations of our knowledge capacities,  there are some special difficulties in uncovering the 
whole network. These complicating factors lie in habit formation and standardisation through 
practices and theory. Kovesi (1967, 13-14) already seems to have seen that in social practices 
such as the law and economic activities, the operations of institutions, the practising of 
professions and in theoretical work, consciously and unconsciously, the functionalities of 
phenomena are becoming articulated more and more in specific forms. The articulation of 
meanings of certain notions are consequently standardised. These practical modifications and 
standardisations influence, of course, our possibilities of uncovering meaning because they 
restrict – one is tempted to say: at a pre-linguistic level – the ways in which we can conceive of 
and formulate functionalities of phenomena. Only investigating and trying to make explicit the 
factors of habit and standardisation, however, offer the opportunities of unveiling hidden parts 
of meaning and of broadening our knowledge.14 
 
7. The functional-contextual approach and (W)RE  
 
In this last section, I shall return to the point of departure for this article. I shall explain how 
(W)RE insofar as it is regarded as a method for justification, may be considered to receive 
justificatory force from the fact that it explicates a worldview-like web of meaning. Finally, I 
will touch upon some diverse questions concerning our inability to spell out and understand 
this framework completely, the hidden treasure of meaning inside it and the ways in which we 
should conceive of moral autonomy in the light of the public character of this worldview. 
                                                             
14 Cf. Vedder (1997) for an example of the ways in which legal and ethical theory have narrowed the 
meaning of privacy.  
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(W)RE may be viewed as an instrument for unravelling a web of meaning existing in the 
tradition of a community. Listing considered judgements about certain controversial notions or 
phenomena stated by ‘the many and the wise’ from a certain cultural tradition or tradition of 
thought, and pruning and adjusting these by confronting them with each other and with 
theories and theoretical conceptions relating to those notions or phenomena – all this can be a 
fruitful way of exploring and formulating the connections between notions within a public 
framework of knowledge. Such explorations may be fruitful for various reasons. Not only do 
they enhance our understanding of ourselves as knowing creatures and moral beings. As I 
showed in section 6, they may also be profitable for our capacities to articulate  
and to solve hitherto unknown moral problems. The coherence and specific connections within 
our framework of knowledge limit the possible applications of the notion. At the same time, 
however, the framework hides a whole range of possibilities to extend the actual knowledge of 
meanings of terms while coherence is maintained. This range of possibilities may be 
systematically uncovered by using the method of (W)RE.  
More importantly, however, where (W)RE is used as a method of moral justification or of 
acceptance of theories or conceptualisations, the ideas about a web of meaning resembling a 
worldview can provide (W)RE with additional justificatory or persuasive force.  As I stated in 
section 1, including endoxa or the conceptions and statements from a tradition as considered 
judgements in (W)RE will at least reduce the possibilities of moral subjectivism because the 
spatiotemporal limitations of the actual individual or groups of individuals are transcended.  
Now, if  these endoxa are understood as expressions of parts of a web of meaning existing in 
the tradition of a community, then including them as considered judgements in (W)RE will also 
show and ensure that a conception or practical judgement resulting from a piece of (W)RE 
reasoning fits with the past and present linguistic intuitions in a community. A set of different 
judgements and statements taken from a larger community and tradition is more likely to 
represent these intuitions than judgements of one individual or some group of 
contemporaneous individuals. Including them because they are considered to be expressions of 
parts of this larger net of knowledge and intuitions will further reduce the possibilities of 
linguistic subjectivism.  
In addition to this, however, if a certain moral authority were assigned to the shared 
experience and knowledge in a community and its traditions, stored in such a web of meaning, 
then including the conceptions and statements from a tradition would provide us with a morally 
normative basis. Now, it is exactly this functional-contextual conception of morality and moral 
language which suggests that we should indeed assign such an authority to shared experience 
and knowledge in communities and traditions. Of course, it is somewhat misleading to say that 
this view suggests to assign authority. In fact, the view in terms of a web claims that this 
shared experience and knowledge stored in our language cannot but exercise it. It does claim 
this dominion amongst others by denying the possibility of rigidly distinguishing between the 
moral and the non-moral (identifying moral and linguistic intuitions) and by its aloofness vis-à-
vis the extra-lingual world. The possibility of finding and explicating sensibly other sources of 
such an authority is thereby excluded. The authority is there already, so to speak; it is only to 
be acknowledged. 
Coming to the end of my article, I would like to say just one more thing on the functional-
contextual approach, moral controversies and moral autonomy. What I have said so far in 
order to characterise the functional-contextual approach of moral language and morality does 
not entail that accepting this approach binds one to believe that all who speak the same 
language or use the same notions actually are in possession of the same knowledge, beliefs and 
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motivations. The natural restrictions on human capacities for knowledge leave room for 
ignorance and error in different degrees and of different kinds in different persons. This opens 
the possibility of controversy. The part of the meaning of a notion, known to one person, need 
not be completely the same as the part known to other persons. As long as there is, however, 
some overlap between them, while they disagree for the rest, they can have a controversy 
about the meaning of the notion. According to the functional-contextual approach, the 
possibilities for deviant use and disagreement, however, are restricted as long as the users of 
the notions want to remain intelligible to others.15 
In the functional-contextual approach, the same kind of restrictions apply to the possibilities 
of moral autonomy. In the strict sense, an individual  cannot be the creator of values. The 
individual can get to know values partially, identify with them, and in this way make them his 
own. Furthermore, he can uncover parts of the meaning of a value, hitherto unknown to him 
and to others. However, he cannot produce values out of nothing. The connections of moral 
notions within a public framework of knowledge, beliefs and motivation do not permit this. 
Conversely, however, these connections and our capacity to explore and formulate them, for 
instance by applying the method of (W)RE, also offer us the opportunity of solving 
disagreements and improving our insight when we are confronted with moral problems. A 
disagreement is not just replaced by explicit agreement or psychological consensus of opinions, 
but by agreement in language or, to use Wittgensteins words, by agreement in form of life. 
                                                             
15 The meaning of a word can be subject to controversies. However, against Gallie (1955-56) I would argue 
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